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I Introduction
In his 1914 poem Mending Wall, Robert Frost questions the wisdom of the
adage "good fences make good neighbors."' The speaker in the poem tells the
1. Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST: THE COLLECTED
POEMS, COMPLETE AND UNABRIDGED 33, 33 (Edward C. Lathemn ed., 1979). The poem states:
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it,
And spills the upper boulders in the sun,
And makes gaps even two can pass abreast.
The work of hunters is another thing:
I have come after them and made repair
Where they have left not one stone on a stone,
But they would have the rabbit out of hiding,
To please the yelping dogs. The gaps I mean,
No one has seen them made or heard them made,
But at spring mending-time we find them there.
I let my neighbor know beyond the hill;
And on a day we meet to walk the line
And set the wall between us once again.
We keep the wall between us as we go.
To each the boulders that have fallen to each.
And some are loaves and some so nearly balls
We have to use a spell to make them balance:
"Stay where you are until our backs are turned!"
We wear our fingers rough with handling them.
Oh, just another kind of out-door game,
One on a side. It comes to little more:
There where it is we do not need the wall:
He is all pine and I am apple orchard.
My apple trees will never get across
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
He only says, 'Good fences make good neighbors.'
Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder
If I could put a notion in his head:
"Why do they make good neighbors? Isn't it
Where there are cows?
But here there are no cows.
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
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tale of a yearly ritual, performed by him and his neighbor, of restoring a wall
between his apple orchard on one side, and the neighbor's pine grove on the
other.2 Questioning the need for the wall, the speaker comments that his apples
will not cross to eat the pinecones beneath his neighbor's trees.
But what if one farmer's crops could harm those of her neighbor? Would
a fence be in order? If so, what would that fence look like? The reality in
today's agricultural world is that there are, indeed, situations where crops can
cause harm beyond the boundaries of the fields in which they are grown.4 This
Note takes an example of such a harm-gene flow from genetically engineered
(GE)5 crops to organic or conventionally bred crops-and proposes one type of
fence that could be employed to help demarcate the limits of the responsibility
that growers of GE crops have to their neighbors. This legal fence would assist
such growers in keeping their transgenes safely corralled, and facilitate
restitution if the transgenes escape and cause harm. Ideally, it would be the
type of boundary that does, indeed, good neighbors make.
A. The Gene Flow Problem
Increased specialization in crops and reduced tolerances for genetic
variation in general, and for transgenic material in particular, have led to a
greater need to segregate GE crops from their conventionally bred and organic
counterparts.6 The entire value of a farmer's crop may depend on the ability to
That wants it down." I could say "Elves" to him,
But it's not elves exactly, and I'd rather
He said it for himself. I see him there
Bringing a stone grasped firmly by the top
In each hand, like an old-stone savage armed.
He moves in darkness as it seems to me~-
Not of woods only and the shade of trees.
He will not go behind his father's saying,
And he likes having thought of it so well




4. See infta Part l.A. (discussing the potential harms associated with gene movement).
5. The terms "genetically engineered" (GE) and "genetically modified" (GM) are both
used to refer to organisms that have been developed through transgenic technology. For
consistency in this Note I will use GE when discussing such organisms.
6. See A. Bryan Endres, Coexistence Strategies, The Common Law ofBiotechnotogy and
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ensure its genetic purity.7 The adventitious presence of undesirable genetic
material, such as DNA derived from GE technology, can result in rejection or
destruction of crops or products made from them.8
At the same time that tolerances for GE traits have been tightening, GE
crop production has been expanding.9 As GE crop production has increased, it
has become clear that the agricultural industry in the United States is not
prepared to keep GE crops separate from conventional or organic crops.10 The
statutes and regulations dealing with GE crops have failed to prevent
contamination of non-GE crops or to provide adequate remedies for those who
have been harmed by such contamination."1
B. Negligence Per Se as a Possible Solution
One possible approach to dealing with the problem of GE contamination is
to provide civil remedies for harms caused when transgenes end up where they
are not supposed to be. 12 A number of traditional tort theories have been
Economic Liability Risks, 13 DRAKE J. AGRic. L. 115, 127-28 (2008) (discussing various
sources of the need for crop segregation, including the market-based demands for GE-free
foods, regulatory requirements intended to protect health and environment, and segregation of
exclusively domestic crops from export crops, necessitated by trade partners' refusal to accept
U.S. crops unless segregation standards were enacted).
7. See Richard A. Repp, Comment, Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for
Genetically Modified Crop Production and Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 585, 591 (2000)
(giving an example of organic products that were rejected and destroyed after DNA testing
revealed that the corn they contained had been contaminated with GE corn, probably through
pollination from adjacent GE corn fields).
8. Id
9. See Gregory N. Mandel, The Future ofBiotechnology Litigation andAdjudication, 23
PACE ENvmL. L. REv. 83, 88-89 (2006) (discussing the rapid acceptance and deployment of GE
crops and the coinciding backlash against these technologies).
10. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary Compliance: Lessons from the
StarLink Corn Fiasco, 27 WM. & MARY ENvmL. L. & POL'Y REv. 593,633 (2003) ("[U]nder the
current system co-mingling of these crops, either by design or inadvertence, is inevitable. A
crisis is waiting to happen."); Gregory N. Mandel, History Lessonsfor a General Theory ofLaw
and Technology, 8 MiNN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 551, 568 (2007) (stating that anyone with a working
knowledge of grain handling and distribution in the United States would know that it was
inevitable that GE crops would be mixed with conventional crops).
11. See Bratspies, supra note 10, at 615 (describing the "gaping holes in [the] regulatory
regime for [GE] crops," which result from trying to force new problems posed by biotechnology
into answers provided by statutes and regulations that were written before the advent of GE
crops).
12. See Thomas Connor, Comment, Genetically Modified Torts: Enlisting the Tort
System to Regulate Agricultural Contamination by Biotech Crops, 75 U. ON. L. REv. 1187,
1214-15 (2007) (suggesting that the civil tort system, in conjunction with proper regulations,
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suggested as potential ways to address the problem.'13 The virtues of applying
many of these tort theories have been explored fairly extensively in the
literature.'14 This Note will examine the use of negligence per se, or statutory
negligence, as a theory of tort liability. With appropriately written regulations,
negligence per se could provide an effective means to protect farmers whose
crops are contaminated with GE material. The predictability of statutory or
regulatory standards of care would also benefit GE growers. If the standards
are definite enough and GE growers know that the courts will base their
evaluations of reasonable conduct on those standards, the growers will be more
free to pursue their occupation because they will know more precisely what is
expected of them.
Part HI of this Note will lay out some background information about GE
crops and the phenomenon of gene flow. Part Ill will then discuss GE
regulations and case law involving gene flow, followed by a discussion of
negligence per se and why it would be an appropriate theory for recovery in tort
for damages caused by wandering genes. Finally, Part IV will consider the
allocation of civil remedies between the federal and state governments, and will
provide some principles that could make the regulatory framework more
amenable to use in establishing duties of care. This discussion will include
some examples of crop characteristics and gene traits and how regulations
might take into account differing biological and agronomic characteristics.
might provide the best way to regulate GE growers' activities). Regarding traditional tort causes
of action as applied to GE crop-related disputes, Connor says: "These unintentional torts are
well-matched to the nature of potential disputes because they provide causes of action
specifically developed for disputes over land use and product-related injuries." Id. at 1211.
Other commentators have suggested different strategies, including strict regulatory compliance
oversight and even criminal sanctions. See Bratspies, supra note 10, at 649 (advocating for a
new regulatory structure that would require agencies to monitor compliance in the growing and
processing of GE crops); Marcia Ellen Degeer, Comment, Can Roundup Ready Seeds Ever Be
Corralled?: Restraining Genetic DriftI Through Criminal Sanctions, 29 NEw ENG. J. ON GRiM.
& Civ. CONFINEMENT 2 55, 261 (2003) ("The lack of a comprehensive regulatory system for GE
plants and the lack of legal recourse invites the proposal of a statute that regulates GE farmers
and imposes criminal sanctions for the spread of GE plants.").
13. See Connor, supra note 12, at 1201 ("Several torts could apply to disputes arising
when one farmer's crop contaminates another farmer's crop. These include negligence, private
nuisance, public nuisance, trespass, and products liability.").
14. See generally id.; Mandel, supra note 9; Katherine Van Tassel, The Introduction of
Biotech Foods to the Tort System. Creating a New Duty to Identify, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 1645
(2004).
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H. Background of Genetically Engineered Crops
People have been genetically modifying crops for thousands of years."5
This was accomplished first by selection and later by intentionally crossing
sexually compatible plants to increase the frequency of desirable traits or to
decrease the frequency of undesirable traits.'16 The requirement of natural
sexual compatibility limited the pool of available genetic traits to those found in
closely related plants.'17 Modem biotechnology allows for the incorporation of
genes from disparate organisms.' 8 No longer are crop developers limited to the
genetic material present in different varieties within the same species; genes can
be incorporated from other genera, families, and even kingdoms of living
organisms.1 9 Plants that have their genetic makeup altered through transgenic
biotechnology are often referred to as GE.2
Although the technology for producing GE crops was developed in the
1 970s, the first commercial GE plant variety was not released until 1 994. 21
Despite the relatively recent advent of GE crops in agriculture, farmers have
adopted these technologies rapidly and GE crops now comprise a significant
portion of crops planted, especially in the United States. 2 The United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) reported that in 2008, GE crops accounted
15. See ROBERT W. ALLARD, PRINCIPLES OF PLANT BREEDING 9 (1960) (discussing
evidence of early plant breeding, including corn breeding in New Mexico between 2500 BC and
500 AD). See generally DESMOND S. T. NICHOLL, AN INTRODUCTION To GENETIC ENGINEERING
(1994) (describing the history of plant breeding).
16. See MAARTEN J. CHRISPEELS & DAVID E. SADA VA, PLANrS, GENES, AND AGRICULTURE
273, 280-82 (1994) (discussing the early process of selection and the later advent of intentional
crosses to improve crop varieties).
17. See JANE RISSLER & MARGARET MELLON, THE ECOLOGICAL RISKS OF ENGINEERED
CROPS 4 (1996) (stating that the pool of genetic material available to traditional breeders is
limited to that found in species that are sexually compatible with the crop plant).
18. See id. at 9-11 (discussing the increased pool of genes available to genetic engineers).
19. See id. at 10-11 (giving examples of gene transfers involving different taxonomic
kingdoms).
20. See Nigel G. Halford, From Primitive Selection to Genetic Modification, Ten
Thousand Years of Plant Breeding, in PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY: CURRENT AND FUTURE
APPLICATIONS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 3, 14 (Nigel G. Halford ed., 2006) (defining
the terms "genetically engineered" and "genetically modified").
2 1. See id. at 13-15 (explaining the history of genetic engineering technology and the
development of the earliest GE crop varieties). The Flavr-Savr tomato was the first
commercially available GE variety in the United States. Id. at 15. It was deregulated in 1994
and went into commercial production in 1996. Id. at 14-15.
22. See Sujatha Sankula, Crop Biotechnology in the United States: Experiences and
Impacts, in PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY: CURRENT AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF GENETICALLY
MODIFIED CROPS, supra note 20, at 28, 28-29 (describing the rapid adoption of GE crops in the
United States).
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for 92% of soybeans, 86% of cotton, and 80% of corn grown in the United
States.2
Proponents of biotechnology point to the tremendous advantages GE crops
can offer over traditionally bred crops.24 Plant breeders and developers now
have a wider range of traits from which to choose to improve the agronomic,
processing, and end-use properties of their crop varieties .2 5  The genetic
engineering of crops can increase crop yields,26 improve the nutritional value of
food,2 reduce reliance on harmful pesticides,2  and decrease the need for
tillage, which can harm soil health .29 GE crops also have great potential for use
in the development and production of plastics, biofuels, 30 and pharmaceuticals,
such as vaccines.3
Critics, however, worry that GE crops are insufficiently tested and that
there is too much uncertainty about the effects they might have on human
health, the environment, and genetic diversity. 32 Opponents of GE crops fear
23. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS SERVICE, 2008 ACREAGE REPORT 24-25 (2008),
available at http://usda.mannlib.comell.edu/usda/nass/Acre/2000s/2008/Acre-06-30-2008.pdf
(listing the amounts of biotech crops grown as a percentage of the total of certain crops).
24. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J.
47, 47 (2001) ("[Bliotechnology applications have the potential to alleviate some of the most
pressing problems facing the global community, as well as to reduce dramatically human
suffering and to improve the quality of life, particularly in the developing world.").
25. See NORMAN C. ELLsTRAND, DANGEROUS LIAISONS? WHEN CULTnvATED PLANTS MATE
WITH THEIR WILD RELATIVES 175 (2003) (listing three major types of transgenic phenotypes that
have been expressed in GE crops: agronomic traits, quality traits, and traits allowing plants to
serve as biochemical factories).
26. See id (stating that agronomic traits have been engineered into crops to directly or
indirectly increase crop yields).
27. See Dietrich Rein & Karin Herbers, Enhanced Nutritional Value of Food Crops, in
PLANT BiOTECHNOLooy: CURRENT AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED
CROPS, supra note 20, at 91, 110 ("[It can be concluded that GM crops in general offer the
opportunity to enrich components with proven health benefits and thereby improve specific food
compositions.").
28. See C. NEIL STEWART. JR., GENnCALLY MODIFIED PLANET: ENviRONmENTAL IMPAcTs
OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS 195 (2004) (discussing the environmental benefits of GE
crop use, including reduced pesticide use).
29. See id. (stating that herbicide tolerant crops encourage no-till agriculture, which
results in reduced soil erosion).
30. See id. at 206-07 (describing the application of GE crops in producing renewable,
biodegradable plastics, as well as alternatives to petroleum for energy production).
31. See Liz Nicholson et al., Production of Vaccines in GM Plants, in PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY: CURRENT AND FUTURE APPUCATioNS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS,
supra note 20, at 164, 164 (discussing the possibilities and advantages of using GE plants to
produce proteins used in vaccines).
32. See STEWART, supra note 28, at 63--64 (discussing concerns about the potential loss of
genetic diversity due to gene flow from GE crops); Daniel Schramm, Note, The Race to Geneva:
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that GE technology will introduce new allergens into the food chain. 33 Some
also point to the inability to segregate GE crops from conventional crops as a
possible concern.3 If GE and conventional crops cannot be separated
effectively in transportation and processing, the argument goes, there is no way
to ensure that crops producing potentially harmful components, such as
pharmaceutical agents, do not end up in the food supply.3 5
GE crops have also garnered considerable opposition due to concerns
about their potential environmental impacts.3 At least one opponent of GE
technology has gone so far as to suggest that it will "spell the end of humanity
as we know it and the end of the world at large."
37
Of particular concern is the phenomenon of gene flow. 38 Gene flow is the
"successful incorporation of genes from one population into another."09 Gene
Resisting the Gravitational Pull of the WTO in the GMO Labeling Controversy, 9 VT. J. ENVTL.
L. 93, 98-99 (2007) ("[T]he very newness of [genetically modified organism] technology has
sparked both political and scientific controversies over their use. Environmentalists, farmers'
advocates, and others opposed to the use of GMO technology have based their criticism on the
potential threats GMOs pose to human health and the envroment ..... )
33. See Glare Mills, John A. Jenkins & Peter R. Shewry, Plant FoodAllergens, in PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY: CURRENT ANr) FuTURE APPLICATIONS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS,
supra note 20, at 243, 254 (mentioning the concern that GE technology will result in
introduction of allergens into the food supply, but stating that risk assessment procedures exist
that would make this unlikely).
34. See Endres, supra note 6, at 123 ("The EPA's current precautionary approach ...
recognizes the impossibility of complete segregation in the existing commodity
production/distribution system--an approach unlikely to change until the food supply chain
(from farm to fork) improves its segregation capabilities."). The issue of segregation of GE and
non-GE crops plays an important role in some of the major cases and will be discussed below.
See infra Part III.B-C.
35. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn. Public Health and
Biopharming, 30 Am. J.L. & MED. 371, 373 (2004) ("Contamination of food crops with non-
food, biopharm compounds is a serious threat to human safety and could result in rapid
dissemination of non-food pharmaceutical or industrial compounds through the world food
supply.").
36. See RISSLER & MELLON, supra note 17, at 22-24 (discussing the potential
environmental effects of transgenic crops); see also P.J.W. Lutman & K. Berry, Environmental
Impact and Gene Flow, in PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY: CuRRENT AND FUTuRE APPLICATIONS OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS, supra note 20, at 265, 266 (discussing the different types of
environmental impacts GE crops can have).
37. See STEwART, supra note 28, at 4 (quoting Dr. Mae-Wan Ho, a geneticist and
outspoken critic of GE technology, regarding genetic engineering biotechnology). This is, of
course, an extreme example, but it illustrates the strong views held by some on the issue.
38. See ELLsTRAND, supra note 25, at 171 ("[A]lmost every general treatment of the
environmental impacts of plant biotechnology gives some consider-ation to gene flow." (citations
omitted)).
3 9. Id at 27.
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flow can occur through pollen movement, seed disbursal, or movement of
vegetative propagules .4 0 The result is that genes may end up where they were
never intended. As hard as it is to predict the effects transgenes will have in
their desired environments, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to predict
how they will behave in unintended contexts .4 1 Furthermore, according to GE
skeptics, unlike many pollutants, which have half-lives and eventually
dissipate, once genes are introduced into ecosystems, they cannot be recalled.4
Gene flow is not unique to GE crops. 43  There is strong evidence
supporting the notion that gene flow between crops and other plant populations
is the rule and not the exception."4 A documented example of gene flow
between conventionally bred crops and weeds is that of grain sorghum and
Johnson grass.4 Sorghum and Johnson grass are related species that can
hybridize fairly easily in normal field conditions.4 As sorghum genes are
introgressed into Johnson grass populations, efforts to improve sorghum
indirectly resulted in weedier Johnson grass that was harder to control.
47
Johnson grass is now "considered to be one of the world's worst weeds.",
4 8
Although gene flow occurs in many conventionally bred crops, GE crops
may create some special problems when the genes that move are transgenes.4
Depending on the trait expressed by the GE crop, it may be more or less likely
to hybridize than its conventionally bred counterparts. 50 The specific genes
40. See id. (listing the various media of gene flow in plants).
41. See M.A. Aithieri, The Ecological Impacts of Transgenic Crops on Agroecosystem
Health, 6 ECOSYSTEM HEALTH 13, 16 (2000) (discussing the unpredictability of transgene
stability and expression in ecosystems).
42. See STEwART, supra note 28, at 7 ("The prevailing belief among skeptics is that once
GM plants are released into the environment, the plants or genes can never be recalled.').
43. See Carol Mallory-Smith & Maria Zapiola, Gene Flow from Glyphosate-Resistant
Crops, 64 PEST MOMT. Sci. 428, 428 (2008) ("Gene flow is a natural phenomenon that is not
unique to GE Crops.").
44. See ELLsTRAND, supra note 25, at 124 (stating that gene flow is more common than it
was once believed to be and presenting evidence to support this claim). One view of gene flow
with a sound basis is that crops belong to a crop-weed-wild complex in which hybridization
occurs sporadically. Id at 119.
45. See id. at 88-89 (discussing the hybridization of sorghum with its wild relatives).
46. See id. at 89 (stating that hybridization can occur between the two species, even
though sorghum is a diploid and Johnson grass is an allotetraploid).
47. See id. ("[I]ntrogression from crop sorghum has been implicated in the evolution of
enhanced weediness in [Johnson grass] in North America, South Asia, and elsewhere."
(citations omitted)).
48. Id (citations omitted).
49. See id. at 171-72 (discussing the possibility that GE crops pose special problems with
regard to gene flow that conventional crops do not).
50. See id at 176 (stating that some traits may intentionally or unintentionally affect a GE
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present in GE crops may also code for proteins that would themselves present
environimental risks. 5'
In addition to the heightened environmental concerns, there are economic
concerns that may attend gene flow from GE crops-economic concerns that
are not present, or are present only to a lesser extent, with conventional crops .
52
For example, if organic certification allows zero tolerance for the presence of
transgenes, regardless of how they found their way into the crop, any amount of
transgenic material detected in the crops precludes marketability as organic-
and may completely preclude its marketability in some markets.5 Similarly, a
grower of conventional crops who acquires transgenes through gene flow might
lose the ability to sell to markets that have limited or no tolerance for GE
crops. 54
III. Gene Flow and the Law
A. Regulation of GE Crops
To understand how negligence per se could be a useful tool in dealing
with the problem of damages caused by gene flow, it is helpful to look first at
how GE crops and their products are regulated. In the United States, GE crops
are regulated primarily by three federal agencies: the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)." The Coordinated
Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology 6 sets out the responsibilities
crop's ability to hybridize).
51. See id at 183-84 (giving the example of moth-resistant GE corn that might emit
insecticidal pollen, which could harm insect populations and upset ecosystems).
52. See Repp. supra note 7. at 593 ("The U.S. grain industry has lost virtually all of the
$200 million annual export market for sale of corn to the EU. ... as a result of EU regulations
restricting the import of GM corn, [and] the inability of the U.S. to prevent intemxig.....)
53. See Lutman & Berry, supra note 36, at 276-77 (discussing the various existing and
proposed thresholds for GE crops in organic and unlabeled conventional foods in Europe and
the United Kingdom).
54. See Repp, supra note 7, at 591 (describing a case where a Texas fanner had an entire
shipment of corn chips rejected and destroyed when traces of GE corn DNA were found in the
chips).
55. See Wendy Thai, Transgenic Crops: The Good, the Bad, and the Laws, 6 MINN. J. L.
Sci. & TECH. 877, 885 (2005) (listing the agencies responsible for regulating GE crops).
56. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302,
23,302 (June 26, 1986).
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of these three agencies with regard to GE crops.57 The purpose of the
Coordinated Framework was to create a "comprehensive federal regulatory
policy for ensuring the safety of biotechnology research and products. 5 The
drafters of the Coordinated Framework believed that there was a sufficient
network of agency control under existing statutes to regulate effectively new
organisms created by GE technology.5 9
Under the Coordinated Framework, the FDA regulates food safety aspects
of GE crops .60 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA) 61 gives
the FDA the authority to remove unsafe or adulterated foods from the
marketplace, and to approve food additives.6 Adulterated foods are those that
contain poisonous or deleterious substances, including pesticides.6 The term
adulterated has been applied to foods that contain material from GE crops that
were not approved for human consumption.64 Any food additive must be
approved by the FDA unless it is generally recognized as safe (GRAS). 65 A
57. See VICTORIA SurroN, LAW AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 35-36 (2007) (discussing the
history of the Coordinated Framework).
58. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, supra note 56, at 23,302.
59. See Sur-roN, supra note 57, at 35 (stating that the belief of the Executive Branch was
that no new statutory authority was needed to regulate biotechnology). The White House
reaffirmed the position that no new statutory authority was required when the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy issued its Principles of Federal Oversight of
Biotechnology in 1991. See Principles of Federal Oversight of Biotechnology: Planned
Introduction Into the Environment of Organisms with Modified Hereditary Traits, 55 Fed. Reg.
at 31,118 (July 31, 1990) (stating that the Coordinated Framework "determined that existing
statutes provide a basic network of agency jurisdiction over both research and products assuring
reasonable safeguards for the public").
60. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, supra note 56, at
23,304 ("Jurisdiction over the varied biotechnology products is determined by their use, as has
been the case with traditional products.... Foods, food additives, human drugs, biologics and
devices, and animal drugs are reviewed or licensed by the FDA.").
61. See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2006)
(prohibiting the introduction into interstate commerce of adulterated foods, including foods
adulterated with pesticides).
62. See Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in
the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 2167,
2218 (2004) (stating that, while there is no statutory provision or FDA regulation specifically
covering GE crops and their derivatives, FDA regulates GE foods in the same way, and under
the same authority, that it regulates conventional food).
63. See 21 U.S.C. § 342 (2006) ("A food shall be deemed to be adulterated.. . [i]f it
bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to
health. ... ).
64. See, e.g., In re Starlink Corn Prod. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 835 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (stating that the FDA has declared StarLink, a GE variety of corn, to be an adulterant).
65. See 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2006) (setting forth the requirements for non-GRAS food
additives to be considered safe).
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food additive is a substance "the intended use of which results or may
reasonably be expected to result... in its becoming a component or otherwise
affecting the characteristics of any food.",66 This definition is broad enough to
include genes inserted into GE crops and the compounds for which those genes
code.6 However, the FDA has treated most GE food products as GRAS and
therefore not subject to regulation as food additives under the FFDCA.6
The EPA, in accordance with its authority to regulate pesticides under the
Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide, and Fungicide Act (FIFRA)69 and the
FFDCA'70 is responsible for regulating plant-incorporated protectants (PIPs).
71
The EPA defines a PIP as "a pesticidal substance that is intended to be
produced and used in a living plant, or in the produce thereof, and the genetic
material necessary for production of such a pesticidal substance. 7 2 Only PIPs
derived from GE technology are subject to regulation under FIFRA.7 The
EPA requires extensive studies, and evaluates potential environmental risks,
including those associated with gene flow, when considering the release of GE
PIpS.74
The USDA regulates GE crops that could be potential plant pests .75 A plant
pest is any living organism "that can directly or indirectly injure, cause damage to,
66. Id § 321(s).
67. See Mandel, supra note 62, at 221 8-i19 (discussing the regulation of GE crops as food
additives under the FFDCA).
68. See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg.
22,984,22,985 (May 29, 1992) ('In most cases, the substances expected to become components
of food as a result of genetic modification of a plant will be the same as or substantially similar
to substances commonly found in food. . . .)
69. See Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide, and Fungicide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq.
(2006) (prohibiting the distribution or sale of unregistered pesticides).
70. See supra note 61 (defining the FFDCA and providing its citation information).
71. See Procedures and Requirements for Plant-Incorporated Protectants, 40 C.F.R.
§ 174.1 (2009) (stating that plant-incorporated protectants are subject to some different
regulations than conventional pesticides, but they are still subject to regulation under FIFRA
and FFDCA).
72. Pesticide Registration and Classification Procedures, 4 C.F.R. § 152.3 (2009).
73. See id. § 174.25 (stating that PIPs are exempt from regulation if the genetic material
that codes for the pesticidal substance came from a sexually compatible plant and was never
derived from an organism that is not sexually compatible with the recipient plant).
74. See Plant Incorporated Protectants, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides-
pips/index.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 20 10) ("When assessing the potential risks of genetically
engineered plant-incorporated protectants, the EPA requires extensive studies examining
numerous factors, such as risks to human health, nontarget organisms and the environment,
potential for gene flow, and the need for insect resistance management plans.") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
75. See Restrictions on the Introduction of Regulated Articles, 7 C.F.R. § 340 n.1 1(2009)
("Part 340 regulates, among other things, the introduction of organisms and products altered or
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or cause disease in any plant or plant product."06 The branch of the USDA that
fulfills this regulatory role is the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS)." APHIS regulates the introduction of GE crops under the Plant
Protection Act (PPA)78 which gives the USDA a mandate to protect agriculture
from pests and diseases .79 This protection includes preventing harmful gene flow
from GE crops .80  All GE crops are presumed to be plant pests, and thus
"regulated articles"8 until they are proven otherwise.8  Because of this, APHIS
has permitting and notification procedures for field testing of new GE varieties. 
83
Some regulated articles can be released for testing without a permit through
a notification procedure.8 To be eligible for introduction under the notification
procedure, a GE crop must meet the following criteria: (1) the plant must not be a
noxious weed, (2) the introduced genetic material must be integrated stably, and
(3) the function of the introduced genetic material must be known and its
produced through genetic engineering that are plant pests or are believed to be plant pests.").
76. Plant Protection Act § 403, 7 U.S.C. § 7702 (2006).
77. See Thai, supra note 55, at 888 (describing the role of APHIS in the regulation of GE
crops).
78. See 7 U. S.C. § § 7701-7 786 et seq. (2006) (authorizing the USDA to undertake action
to detect, control, eradicate, suppress, prevent, or retard the spread of plant pests and noxious
weeds).
79. See BRS Factsheet, U.S. Dep't of Agric., APHIS Biotechnology: Perm-itting Progress
Into Tomorrow, at 1 (Feb. 2006), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/biotechnology/
content/printable version/BRSFSpermitprogress,_2-06.pdf [hereinafter BRS Factsheet] (last
visited Mar. 22, 20 10) (giving the statutory authority for APHIS's regulation of GE crops) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The Biotechnology Regulatory Services (BRS)
is the branch of APHIS that regulated the introduction of GE organisms.
80. See Thai, supra note 55, at 888 (discussing the role the USDA plays in regulating GE
plants and their products).
8 1. See 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2009) (defining regulated articles). Regulated article is defined
as:
Any organism which has been altered or produced through genetic engineering, if
the donor organism, recipient organism, or vector or vector agent belongs to any
genera or taxa desiguated [as a plant pest] and meets the definition of plant
pest .. , or any other organism or product altered or produced through genetic
engineering which the Administrator determines is a plant pest or has reason to
believe is a plant pest.
Id
82. See Thai, supra note 55, at 888 ("A transgenic plant is assumed to be a plant pest until
proven otherwise.").
83. See BRS Factsheet, supra note 79, at 2-3 (describing the processes of permitting and
notification and the requirements for each).
84. See Notification for the Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles, 7 C.F.R. § 340.3
(2008) (setting forth the conditions under which a regulated article may be introduced without a
permit).
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expression must not result in plant disease or the production of infectious, toxic,
pharmaceutical, or industrial material.8 If the GE crop meets these criteria and
the producer follows certain performance guidelines to prevent the escape and
persistence of the crop, the crop may be introduced.8 The producer is only
required to notify APHIS and provide certain information about the crop.8
To move, import, or field test a regulated article that does not qualify for, or
is denied the notification procedure, a permit is required.8 Permits are always
required and the permitting process is more involved for pharmaceutical-
producing plants .89 The purpose of the permitting process is to prevent the
dissemination of the regulated article until it can be evaluated under field
conditions. 90
After a period of field testing, GE crop developers can petition for
nonregulatory status.9 Upon application for deregulation, APHIS conducts an
environmental assessment and opens the matter for public comment.92 If APHIS
decides that the crop is not a plant pest, it reaches a "finding of no significant
impact" (FONS I), and the crop may be grown under less restrictive conditions.
Certain GE traits, such as the production of pharmaceutical agents, are always
considered plant pests and are, therefore, subject to more intense regulation. 94
Once a GE crop is deregulated, it can be sold and grown like its conventionally
bred counterparts. 95 APHIS may, however, bring any deregulated item back
85. Id. § 340.3(b).
86. Id § 340.3(a).
87. Id § 340.3(d).
88. See Permits for the Introduction of a Regulated Article, 7 C.F.R. § 340.4 (2009)
(stating the requirements for permitting a regulated article).
89. See BRS Factsheet, supra note 79, at 2 ("APHIS-BRS conducts a more
comprehensive review of permit applications if they are used for GE plants that could have an
elevated risk, such as plants that produce pharmaceutical or industrial compounds . ... ").
90. See id at 2-3 (providing that the permittee must comply with a list of conditions, and
any other conditions deemed by the Administrator to be necessary to prevent dissemination); see
also Mandel, supra note 62, at 2226 ("The primary emphasis of the permitting process is
confinement.").
91. See BRS Factsheet, supra note 79, at 4 (stating that after a GE crop has been shown
not to be a plant pest risk, the developer may petition for removal of the product from the list of
regulated crops).
92. See id (describing the process of deregulation).
9 3. Id
94. See Thai, supra note 55, at 890 (stating that all pharmaceutical producing GE crops
are considered by APHIS to be regulated articles and, therefore, subject to confinement
procedures regardless of the stage of development).
95. See BRS Factsheet, supra note 79, at 4 ("Once BRS has granted a product
nonregulatory status, the product may be freely moved and planted without the requirement of
permits or other regulatory oversight by BRS.").
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under regulation at any time if new information becomes available suggesting that
it might be a plant pest. 
96
The problem is that, although a crop may pass the FDA's requirements for
food safety (assuming it is a food crop), the EPA's environmental standards
(assuming it is considered a PIP), and APHIS's requirements for deregulation, it
may yet cause harm to other farmers through gene flow. 97 The types of harm that
may occur simply are not contemplated by the regulations described above.9
This was demonstrated clearly in In re StarLink Corn Products Liability
Litigation,"9 a case discussed in detail below.
B. StarL ink Corn
In late 2000, StarLink corn, a GE variety not approved for human
consumption, was detected in taco shells.'100 What ensued was one of the most
well known GE food scares to date.' 0' The incident illustrated many of the
things that can go wrong with GE crops and highlighted the shortcomings of
the regulatory framework in preventing the commingling of GE and
conventional products.
96. See id (discussing re-listing of deregulated products).
97. See Mandel, supra note 62, at 223 3-36 (discussing gaps in the regulatory framework
of GE crops).
98. See id. at 2172 (stating that it is not surprising that there should be lapses in oversight
of GE crops, considering that they are regulated pursuant to statutes passed decades before the
technologies were developed).
99. See In re StarLink Corn Prod. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 852 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(granting defendant's motion to dismiss claims for conversion and violation of the North
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, but denying defendant's motion to dismiss claims of
negligence per se, public nuisance, private nuisance and violations of the Tennessee Consumer
Protection Act, and dismissing negligence and strict liability claims). In StarLink, corn farmers
brought suit against the producer of a GE corn variety not approved for human consumption
when that variety was found in food products throughout the country. Id. at 835. The plaintiffs
claimed that they had been injured by the drop in prices and demand for corn due to
contamination, which they alleged was caused by the defendant's failure to comply with the
EPA's requirements regarding the distribution and production of the GE crop. Id. The
plaintiffs brought several causes of action, including negligence, strict liability, nuisance, and
conversion. Id. at 833. The defendant moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that FIFRA
preempted the state law claims, that the economic loss doctrine prevented recovery, and that the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim. Id. The defendant's motion was granted in part and denied in
part. Id at 852.
100. Id at 835.
101. See Mandel, supra note 62, at 2203 (commenting on the significant attention garnered
by the StarLink incident).
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StarLink was a corn variety that carried a gene coding for a protein that is
toxic to certain insect pests.'02 The protein, known as Cry9C, possessed some
of the attributes of known human allergens, and as a result, StarLink had not
been approved for human consumption.' 03 The EPA approved StarLink for
animal feed and industrial uses in 1998.1'4 Despite its best efforts, Aventis
CropScience, the company developing StarLink, was unable to obtain approval
for StarLink as a human food.1
05
Because of the split approval, special restrictions were placed on the
growing of StarLink to prevent it frm mixing with corn destined for human
consumption.10 6 These restrictions included a 660-foot buffer zone that was
required between any StarLink corn and conventional corn to prevent cross-
pollination.10 7  In addition, Aventis CropScience was required to inform
growers of the special growing and handling restrictions required by the
EPA.10 8 The growers were then required to sign agreements stating that they
102. See StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 833-34 (describing the StarLink corn variety and the
insecticidal protein it produced).
103. See id at 834 (stating the reasons why the EPA denied Aventis CropScience's
application for registration for human consumption).
104. See id. (discussing the EPA's decision to allow StarLink a limited registration for
purposes such as animal feed, ethanol production and seed increase).
105. See Mandel, supra note 62, at 2203-04 (discussing the history of the EPA's actions
regarding StarLink and Aventis CropScience's repeated attempts to acquire registration for
human consumption).
106. See In re StarLink Corn Prod. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834-35 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (listing the special conditions the EPA required of Aventis CropScience before granting
the registration).
107. Id at 834.
108. See id. at 834-35 (outlining the information and use requirements placed on Aventis
CropScience pursuant to the StarLink registration). In 1999 the EPA agreed to expand the
acreage limit of StarLink corn to 2.5 million if Aventis CropScience would do the following:
(a) inform purchasers (i.e. "Growers") at the time of StarLink seed corn sales, of the
need to direct StarLink harvest to domestic feed and industrial non-food uses
only;
(b) require all Growers to sign a "Grower Agreement" outlining field management
requirements and stating the limits on StarLink corn use;
(c) deliver a Grower Guide, restating the provisions stated in the Grower
Agreement, with all seed;
(d) provide all Growers with access to a confidential list of feed outlets and
elevators that direct grain to domestic feed and industrial uses;
(e) write to Growers prior to planting, reminding them of the domestic and
industrial use requirements for StarLink corn;
(0write to Growers prior to harvest, reminding them of the domestic and industrial
use requirements for StarLink corn;
(g) conduct a statistically sound follow-up survey of Growers following harvest, to
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would abide by the EPA's requirements for planting, cultivation, and use of the
product before they would be allowed to grow it. 109 In the twenty-nine-month
period from May 1998 to October 2000, StarLink corn acreage increased from
10,000 acres to 350,000 acres."'
Despite the precautions enacted to prevent StarLink from getting into
human food, in September of 2000, StarLink was discovered in Taco Bell taco
shells, prompting Kraft Foods, the producer of the shells, to recall more than
2.5 million boxes of taco shells.' Taco Bell pulled all taco shells from all of
its restaurants. 1 2Several major food companies had to cease production at
certain facilities because of contamination fears." 3  StarLink corn was
eventually detected in a wide range of foods, resulting in the recall of over 300
products. 114
After investigators detected StarLink in corn bound for Asia, Japan and
Korea "terminated or substantially limited" shipments of U.S. corn."' These
countries' refusal to accept any U.S. corn led to a reduction in exports, costing
growers tens of millions of dollars." 6 The depressed demand caused corn
prices to drop dramatically.'
Due to the widespread contamination, mills and production facilities were
required to implement expensive tests to detect the presence of Cry9C. 1 " The
monitor compliance with the Grower Agreement.
Id.
109. See Mandel, supra note 62, at 2204 (discussing the requirement of signing a grower
agreement as part of the registration of StarLink).
110. StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2dat 834-35.
111. See Barnaby J. Feder, Companies Act to Keep Bicengineered Corn Out of ood, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2000, at C2 (discussing the extent of the efforts in response to the StarLink
contamination).
112. See Andrew Pollack, Kraft Recalls Taco Shells with Bioengineered Corn, N.Y. Twms,
Sept. 23, 2000, at Cl1 (stating that Taco Bell pulled all the taco shells from its restaurants even
though it had not confirmed that the shells being pulled were contaminated with StarLink corn).
113. See Mandel, supra note 62, at 2204 ("Kellogg, ConAgra, and Archer Daniels Midland
were all forced to stop production at certain plants because of concerns about StarLink
contamination.").
114. See id (describing the widespread nature of the StarLink corn contamination).
115. See In re StarLink Corn Prod. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 835 (N.D. 111. 2002)
("South Korea, Japan and other foreign countries have terminated or substantially limited
imports of U.S. corn.").
116. See Mandel, supra note 62, at 2205 (giving an example of the costs of the
contamination borne by the growers of StarLink corn).
117. See StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (stating the reasons the plaintiffs brought the suit
against Aventis CropScience, including increased production costs and lower prices allegedly
resulting from Aventis CropScience's actions).
118. Id. at 835.
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FDA issued screening guidelines to help minimize the production of human
food with StarLink in it.' 19 These guidelines were in effect until 2008, when
the FDA finally decided that StarLink had been removed sufficiently from the
human food supply, rendering testing no longer necessary.' 
2 0
In an effort to curtail the effects of the crisis, Aventis CropScience
voluntarily withdrew its registration for StarLink and bought back all the
StarLink corn produced in 2000. 12 1 The cost of the buyback was nearly $ 100
million.'12 2 Although the exact costs of the StarLink contamination are not
known, estimates range from $ 100 million to over $1 billion.123
After the contamination became public, there were a number of cases of
individuals complaining of adverse reactions resulting from consuming taco
shells.124 However, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported that there
were no confirmed incidents of allergic reactions resulting from consumption of
food containing Cry9C.125 Although there were no adverse health effects, the
incident demonstrated the inability of the agricultural commodity production
and distribution networks to keep GE and conventional products separate. 126
119. See Guidance for Industry on FDA Recommendations for Sampling and Testing
Yellow Corn and Dry-Milled Yellow Corn Shipments Intended for Human Food Use for Cry9C
Protein Residues; Availability, 66 Fed. Reg. 6,627, 6,628 (Jan. 22, 2001) (stating that the
widespread presence of the Cry9C protein in human food products justified the implementation
of screening at milling facilities, and outlining what those screenings should look like).
120. See Guidance for industry on the Food and Drug Administration Recommendations
for Sampling and Testing Yellow Corn and Dry-Milled Yellow Corn Shipments Intended for
Human Food Use for Cry9C Protein Residues; Withdrawal of Guidance, 73 Fed. Reg. 22,716,
22,717 (Apr. 25, 2008) (stating that the FDA was withdrawing its guidelines for the industry
because of the release of the EPA's findings that the Cry9C protein no longer posed a threat to
human health).
121. See Mandel, supra note 62, at 2205 (describing the steps that Aventis CropScience
took to try to mitigate the harm caused by the contamination).
122. Id.
123. See Sheryl Lawrence, Comment, What Would You Do with a Fluorescent Green Pig?:
How Novel Transgenic Products Reveal Flaws in the Foundational Assumptions for the
Regulation of Biotechnology, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201, 273 (2007) (discussing estimates of the
costs associated with the StarLink contamination).
124. See id. at 274 ("~[T~here were mass reports of allergic reactions to the StarLink
products following publication of the contamination. .. .)
125. See Press Release, CDC Division of Media Relations, CDC Involvement in
Investigating Adverse Health Effects Associated with Eating Corn Products Potentially
Contaminated with the Cry9C Protein in StarLink Corn (June 13, 2001), http://
www.cdc.gov/media/pressrelrOlo06l3a.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 20 10) (describing the CDC's
investigation of possible adverse health effects among people who claimed to have had allergic
reactions to potentially contaminated corn products) (on tile with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
126. See D.L. Uchtmann, StarLink: A Case Study of Agricultural Biotechnology
Regulation, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 159, 209 (2002) ("The current U.S. grain marketing system
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As a result of the contamination and the subsequent drop in demand for
U.S. corn, numerous class action suits were brought against Aventis
CropScience.127 Classes included farmers whose crops had been contaminated
with StarLink by commingling with StarLink corn and by cross-pollination .'28
There were also attempts to sue Aventis CropScience on behalf of all corn
growers because of the depressed corn prices that occurred as a result of the
incident.129 These class action lawsuits eventually were combined into one
multidistrict case.'130
The plaintiffs in StarL ink brought causes of action against Aventis
CropScience for negligence, public and private nuisance, strict liability, and
conversion.'13 1 Aventis CropScience moved to dismiss, claiming that FIFRA
preempted the plaintiffs' state law claims, that the economic loss rule barred
recovery, and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under any of the legal
theories presented in their complaint.132 Aventis CropScience's motion was
granted in part and denied in part. 13Aventis CropScience settled some of the
claims for a reported $1 10 million.1
34
Although the case was not ultimately decided by the court, the StarLink
opinion provides some guidance for how cases of harmn caused by gene flow or
has difficulty keeping a particular crop variety in 'feed only' marketing channels, at least when
the crop is planted on a rather large scale."); see also Bratspies, supra note 10, at 645 ("The
CDC may have concluded that there is too little StarLink contamination to pose a human health
risk, but the dangers the crisis revealed about an inadequate regulatory climate remain
significant and unaddressed.").
127. See Charles A. Deacon & Emilie K. Paterson, Emerging Trends in Biotechnology
Litigation, 20 REV. LITIG. 589, 614-15 (2001) (describing the lawsuits filed against Aventis
CropScience in the aftermath of the StarLink contamination).
128. See In re StarLink Corn Prod. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 841-42 (N.D. 1ll.
2002) (describing the various ways that non-StarLink corn could have become contaminated
with StarLink corn).
129. See Dupraz v. Aventis CropScience USA Holding, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1103
(D.S.D. 2001) (stating that the plaintiff sought to certify' a class including "all persons and
entities who cultivated and harvested non-StarLink corn in the State of South Dakota for
commercial purposes from 1998 to the present").
130. See StarLink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (stating that the fifteen separately filed cases




134. See Thomas P. Redick & Donald L. Uchtmann, Coexistence Through Contracts:
Export-Oriented Stewardship in Agricultural Biotechnology vs. California 's Precautionary
Containment, 13 DRAKE J. AGRic. L. 207, 213-14 (2008) (commenting on the settlement
between Aventis CropScience and growers of contaminated corn). Aventis also settled a class
action suit with consumers for over $9 million. Id at 214.
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commingling will be handled. Significantly for this discussion, the court said
that negligence per se was an appropriate claim under the circumstances.135
The court also said that only farmers whose crops were physically harmed by
contamination, either through cross-pollination or post-harvest commingling,
were eligible for recovery of damages.136  Those who acquired StarLink
unknowingly before planting and those who sued based solely on the drop in
corn prices were barred from recovery. 37
C. LibertyLink Rice
In a more recent case, similar to StarLink, traces of two lines of GE rice
not approved for human consumption were found in several places in the food
supply chain.'38 The two lines, LLRICE601 and LLRICE604, were part of a
family of LibertyLink crops that express a protein conferring resistance to the
herbicide glufosinate.' 39  Two other related rice lines, LLRICEO6 and
LLRICE62, containing the same protein, had already been approved by the
USDA for commercial use, although they had not been put into production.14 0
135. See In re StarLink Corn Prod. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 852 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(denying Aventis CropScience's motion to dismiss the negligence per se-based claims).
136. See id at 841 ("Non-StarLink corn crops are damaged when they are pollinated by
StarLink corn.... Non-StarLink corn is also damaged when it is commingled with StarLink
corn. Once mixed, there is no way to resegregate the corn ... [t]he entire batch is considered
tainted.").
137. See id. at 841-42 (stating that farmers who purchase contaminated seed are barred
from recovery because they could have bargained with their suppliers for pure seed and did not,
and those whose seed was commingled by food manufacturers during processing were also
barred because the harm occurred after they relinquished their ownership rights). The court
said: "Absent a physical injury, plaintiffs cannot recover for drops in market prices. Nor can
they recover for additional costs, such as testing procedures, imposed by the marketplace." Id.
at 842.
138. See A. Bryan Endres & Justin G. Gardner, Genetically Engineered Rice: A Summary
of the LL Rice 601 Incident, AGRIC. L. & TAXATION BRIEFs 2 (2006), available at
http://www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/legal/articles/ALTBs/ALTB_06-04/ALTB_06-04.pdf(discussing
the discovery of LibertyLink Rice in conventional rice planted in 2005).
139. See USDA, Report of LibertyLink Rice Incidents, at 3 (2007), available at www.
aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/2007/1 0/content/printable/RiceReportl0-2007.pdf[hereinafter
USDA Rice Report] (stating that the 35SBar gene, which is common to all of the lines and
conferred resistance to glufosinate, has a long history of safe use, is present in many deregulated
products, and had undergone and passed rigorous safety testing at the time the contamination
occurred).
140. See Endres & Gardner, supra note 138, at 1 (stating that, although Bayer CropScience
had approval for LLRICEO6 and LLRICE62, it "chose not to market these genetically
engineered varieties ... because growers were not interested in producing rice not yet approved
for sale in major importing nations such as Japan and the European Union").
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However, Bayer CropScience, the company developing the product, had only
sought an experimental use permit for LLRICE60 1.'4
In January 2006, traces of the LLRICE60 1 were discovered in Midwestern
long-grain rice by Riceland, the nation's largest rice cooperative. 42Bayer
CropScience confirmed that the rice was indeed LLRICE60 1 and reported the
problem to the USDA, which promptly initiated an investigation.14 1 In 2007,
low levels of GE rice, later identified as LLRICE6O4, were found in rice
samples, prompting further inquiry by the USDA. 144
After an investigation that required 8,500 staff hours in eleven states and
Puerto Rico, the USDA finally reported on February 20, 2007 that it did not
know how the regulated rice ended up in the food supply and that it would
pursue no enforcement action against any entities as a result of the incident.14 5
The investigation did reveal, however, that the LLRICE604 contamination was
not likely the result of cross-pollination.'4 The USDA decided that
LLRICE60 1 did not pose any health risks and deregulated it in November
2006, but in many ways the damage was already done.'1
47
As soon as news of the contamination got out, Japan stopped importation
of any U.S. long-grain rice and the European Union required purity testing of
14 1. Id.
142. See Endres, supra note 6, at 134 (discussing the discovery of GE material in
conventional rice from the 2005 season). Riceland originally thought that the GE material was
contamination from residue of GE corn or soybeans that may have been transported in the same
equipment. Id After a significant number of samples tested positive, Riceland contacted Bayer
CropScience, which confirmed that it was LLRICE601. Id.
143. See USDA Rice Report, supra note 139, at 3-4 (stating that Bayer CropScience orally
informed the USDA of the possibility of low levels of GE contamination in rice on July 3 1,
2006 and that the USDA began its investigation on August 1, 2006).
144. See id at 5-6 (stating that, because of the LLRICE601 incident, rice grower
associations implemented testing procedures to ensure that U.S. rice did not contain GE
material, and describing the subsequent discovery and identification of LLRICE604 in up to
thirty percent of certain rice varieties).
145. See id at 1-2 (describing the extensive nature of the investigation and stating that,
given the lack of definitive evidence, APHIS would not be able to take any action against Bayer
CropScience).
146. See id. at 6-7 (stating that, based on records kept at the research facilities where the
varieties were grown, the variety containing LLRICE604 was not ever grown at the same time as
the CL13 1 variety, which ended up being contaminated with LLRICE6O4, thus ruling out the
possibility of pollen-mediated gene flow).
147. See id. at 3 (stating that "[flederal authorities have concluded that LibertyLink rice
poses no threat to food safety, human health, or the environment, and after thorough safety
evaluations, APIS extended deregulation to include LLRICE601 in November 2006"); Redick
& Uchtmann, supra note 134, at 212 (pointing out that the "plaintiffs [in the LibertyLink
litigation] argue that economic harm had already occurred because of Bayer's delay in detecting
and reporting the commingling").
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every shipment of rice from the United States.14 8 Russia, Canada, Taiwan, the
Philippines, and Iraq also restricted the importation of U.S. rice because of the
contamination.14 9  The announcement caused an immediate decline in rice
futures and products made with U.S. rice were pulled off the shelves of grocery
stores throughout the European Union. 50 As occurred with the StarLink
contamination, many farmers filed lawsuits claiming damages resulting from
the drop in demand due to the contamination.' 5' Many of these lawsuits were
joined into one, which is pending in the Eastern District of Missouri.1
52
Regardless of the outcome of the litigation, these events revealed that many of
the regulatory problems that led to the StarLink incident have yet to be
remedied.153
D. Negligence Per Se
1. Overview
Negligence per se, or statutory negligence, is a legal doctrine that
presumes an act to be negligent if it is in violation of a statute.154 This doctrine
only applies to statutes that are enacted to protect a particular group of people
148. See Endres & Gardner, supra note 138, at 3 (describing the international reaction to
the discovery of GE rice in conventional rice in the United States).
149. See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 251 F.R.D. 392, 393 (E.D. Mo. 2008)
(listing the nations that placed import restrictions on U.S. rice).
150. See Redick & Uchtmann, supra note 134, at 211 (summarizing the aftermath of the
discovery of LibertyLink contamination).
151. See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 251 F.R.D. at 394 ("Plaintiffs' primary
claim for damages, however, is that the defendants' activities caused a market loss injury to the
U.S. rice market.").
152. See Transfer Order at 1-2, In re LLRice6Ol Contamination Litigation, No. 1811 (E.D.
Mo. Dec. 19, 2006), available at http://www.bayerricelitigation.com/pdfs/12. 19.06%/20
MDL_-Transfer_-Order.PDF (tranisferring thirteen cases to the Eastern District of Missouri and
noting the existence of a number of tag along cases, which, although not consolidated, were
based on the same causes of action). Regarding the cases, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation said that "[c]enrlization ... is necessary in order to eliminate duplicative discovery,
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings (especially with respect to questions of class certification),
and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary." Id. at 2.
153. See Endres, supra note 6, at 138 (stating that the LibertyLink incident demonstrates
the "lingering post-StarLink coexistence concerns").
154. See, e.g., Reed v. Molnar, 423 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Ohio 1981) ("Where there exists a
legislative enactment commanding or prohibiting for the safety of others the doing of a specific
act and there is a violation of such enactment solely by one whose duty it is to obey it, such
violation constitutes negligence per se. .. .". (internal quotations omitted)).
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and prevent particular types of harm. 55 To prevail on a claim of negligence per
se, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant violated the statute.'5
Additionally, the plaintiff must be in the class of people the statute was
designed to protect.157 If the above conditions are met, the plaintiff must then
prove that the defendant's violation of the statute was the proximate cause of
harm to the plaintiff.158
In contrast with common law negligence, where the existence of a duty of
care is a question left to the finder of fact, in cases of negligence per se, the
duty of care is established by statute." 9 However, not all statutes create duties
of care.'160 A statute that does not define a standard of care, but merely imposes
an administrative requirement, cannot be used as a basis for negligence per se
claims.'16 ' Even statutory requirements, such as licensing and reporting, that are
enacted to promote public safety do not necessarily create duties.162  For a
statute to establish a duty of care upon which a civil action can be brought, the
155. See OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 918 P.2d 1274, 1296 (Kan. 1996) ("In order for
the violation of a statute or ordinance to constitute negligence per se, the statute must be
designed to protect a specific group of people, not just designed to protect the general public
with incidental consideration given to the protection of a certain group.').
156. See Moody v. Boston & Me. Corp., 921 F.2d 1, 4(1 st Cir. 1990) ("Under a traditional
negligence per se analysis, proof of defendant's violation of a safety statute designed to protect
the party who was injured against the type of injury which occurred, relieves the plaintiff from
pleading the negligence elements of foreseeability, duty and breach."); Cannon v. Jones, 377 So.
2d 1055, 1058 (Miss. 1979) ("Although violation of a statute is negligence per se, in order to
rely on it, there must be a showing .. . that the statute was indeed violated.").
157. See Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 158 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that under
Virginia law, in order to establish the duty element of negligence per se, 'the plaintiff must
show that the injured person is a member of a class for whose benefit the legislation was
enacted" (internal quotations omitted)).
158. See id ("The plaintiff must also show that the breach of duty was a proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injury.").
159. See Taft v. Derricks, 613 N.W.2d 190, 194 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) ("When a statute
provides that under certain circumstances particular acts shall or shall not be done, it may be
interpreted as fixing a standard for all members of the community, from which it is negligence to
deviate." (internal quotations omitted)).
160. See OMI1 Holdings, 918 P.2d at 1296 ("A statute which is clearly promulgated to
provide safety and welfare for the public at large does not impose a duty on the statute violator
which is owed to the person injured; thus, negligence per se is inapplicable.").
161. See Talley, 179 F.3d at 159 ("Where a statutory provision does not define a standard
of care but merely imposes an administrative requirement, such as the requirement to obtain a
license or to file a report to support a regulatory scheme, violation of such requirement will not
support a negligence per se claim.").
162. See id. (stating that "[elven if the regulatory scheme as a whole is designed to protect
the public or promote safety, the licensing duty itself is not a standard of care, but an
administrative requirement" (citations omnitted)).
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intent of the legislature to establish such a duty must be clear.16 1 If the
legislation either explicitly or by necessary implication provides that its
violation will result in civil liability, then courts must apply it.' 6 Depending on
the jurisdiction, violation of such statutes can be considered negligence per se,
create a rebuttable presumption of negligence, or may only be considered as
evidence of negligence.16 5 In addition to statutes, administrative regulations
can also create duties of care.1
66
2. The Johnson Grass Statute
One historical example of the use of negligence per se in the agricultural
context, and one that is somewhat analogous to the gene flow situation, is the
Johnson Grass Statute enacted by the Texas Legislature in 190 1.167 This law
was enacted to protect farmers from having their fields infested with Johnson
grass from railroad rights of way abutting their property. 6
Railroad cars traveling all around the country provide an effective means
of distributing weed seed, including Johnson grass, which is a particularly
noxious weed.'169 Although Johnson grass presents a serious threat to farmers,
163. See Antwaun A. ex rel. Muwonge v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 596 N.W.2d 456, 466
(Wis. 1999) ("[A] statute will not be interpreted to impose a greater duty than that imposed by
the common law unless it clearly and beyond any reasonable doubt expresses such purpose by
language that is clear, unambiguous, and peremptory." (internal quotations omitted)).
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. c (1965) (discussing the
circumstances under which courts are required to apply negligence per se to violations of
statutes). The Restatement also says that in the absence of a provision for civil liability, courts
are free to decide whether or not to adopt statutory requirements as standards of care. Id. cmt. d.
165. Compare Rogers v. Stilhman, 268 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Ark. 1954) (stating that in
Arkansas, violation of a statute is only considered evidence of negligence, to be taken into
account with the other facts and circumstances of the case), with Ramnirez v. Nelson, 188 P.3d
659, 665 (Cal. 2008) (stating that, according to the California Evidence Code, "violation of a
statute gives rise to a presumption of negligence" (internal quotations omnitted)), and Ray v.
Goldsmith, 400 N.E.2d 176, 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) ("In Indiana a non-excused or non-
justified violation of a duty prescribed by statute or ordinance is negligence per se.").
166. See Karle v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 448 F. Supp. 753, 767 (W.D. Pa. 1978)
("It is well established that federal regulations have the same force as the federal statute under
which they are promulgated." (citations omitted)).
167. See Johnson Grass Statute, 1901 Tex. Gen. Laws 283 (repealed 2007) (prohibiting
railway companies operating in the state from allowing Johnson grass to go to seed on their
rights of way).
168. See San Antonio & A.P. Ry. Co. v. Bumns, 87 S.W. 1144, 1146 (Tex. 1905) ("The
policy of the state in enacting the [Johnson grass] law was to prevent the spread of Johnson
grass.
169. See Robert J. Hill, Pa. Dep't Agric., Weed Circular No. 4: Johnsongrass, Sorghum
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it does not impact the operation of the trains, so the railroads have little
incentive to implement costly control measures along their lines.' 70 As a result,
Johnson grass on railroad lands was often allowed to head and produce seed,
which was disbursed onto the agricultural fields adjacent to the tracks. ' 7 '
The Johnson Grass Statute prohibited railway companies operating in the
state from allowing Johnson grass or Russian thistle to go to seed on their rights
of way.'172 The statute also provided for a penalty and damages in favor of
farmers whose lands were adjacent to railways where Johnson grass had been
allowed to go to seed as long as the farmers had not let the weed go to seed on
their own lands.17 3  Because of the clearly expressed provision for a civil
remedy, the courts were obliged to apply negligence per se analysis to lawsuits
brought by farmers against the railroad companies.1
7 4
There are at least three characteristics of the Johnson Grass Statute that
make it a good example of what a statute or regulation should look like if it is to
be used as a basis for claims of negligence per se. First, it identified the
particular group of persons it was designed to protect.175 Although it did not
state explicitly the harm it intended to prevent, the desire to limit the spread of
Johnson grass onto farmers' fields was implicit. Second, it identified the group
for whom the statute created a new duty.'176 The statute singled out the railroads
and imposed exclusively on them a new duty.'177  This element was
halepense (L.) Pers. and Shattercane, Sorghum bicolor (L) Moench ssp. drummondii (Steud.)
de Wet, 9 REGuLATORY HoR'ncuLTuRE 1, 2 (1983), available at http://www.agriculture.
state.pa.us (follow "Publications' hyperlink; then select "Control Weed Article Johnson Grass"
under "Select by Publication Name") (stating that railroads are a major means of distributing
Johnson grass seed, and that it continues to be a major weed problem).
170. See Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) (giving as one
possible justification for the Johnson Grass Statute that "whereas self-interest leads the owners
of farms to keep down pests, the railroad companies have done nothing in a matter which
concerns their neighbors only").
171. See Wichita Falls, Ranger & Fort Worth Ry. Co. v. Sparks, 12 S.W.2d 1082, 1083
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (citing several circumstances in which railroads allowed Johnson grass
and other weeds to go to seed on lands they controlled).
172. Johnson Grass Statute, 1901 Tex. Gen. Laws 283 § 1 (repealed 2007).
173. Id. § 2.
174. See Wichita Falls, 12 S.W.2d at 1084 (stating that because the purpose of the statute
was to prevent railroad companies from letting Johnson grass go to seed, any who did so would
be considered negligent per se and adjacent farmers would need to prove no other negligence).
175. See Johnson Grass Statute, 1901 Tex. Gen. Laws 283 (repealed 2007) (extending a
legal right exclusively to any person owning, leasing or controlling land contiguous to railroad
rights of way).
176. See id. § I (making the prohibited act unlawful only for "any railroad or railway
company or corporation doing business in [Texas]").
177. Id.
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controversial and was challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment178 to the United States Constitution.179 The United
States Supreme Court upheld the law, saying that singling out the railroads was
justified sufficiently.180 Third, the law was clear in creating a civil remedy and
the conditions under which that remedy could be had.' 8' There could be no
question from the plain language of the statute that it was intended to create a
private right that could be enforced through the civil court system. These three
characteristics are important to keep in mind when considering potential
statutory or regulatory solutions to the problem of gene flow.
3. Negligence Per Se in Cases of Gene Flow
With appropriate regulations, negligence per se could be an effective
means of establishing liability for damages resulting from gene flow. Without a
duty there can be no negligence.182 The problem with common law negligence
in the context of GE crops is that there are no recognized duties or standards of
care.'183 GE crops are so new that no one really knows how the reasonable
grower of GE crops should behave. 184 Negligence per se removes ambiguity
about who owes what duties to whom.
178. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
179. See Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 269-70 (1904) (upholding the
Johnson Grass Statute).
180. See id. (stating that there was insufficient evidence that the discrimination against
railroads was unfair enough to justify' disturbing the law). Justice Holmes, who delivered the
opinion of the court, stated:
When a state legislature has declared that in its opinion policy requires a certain
measure, its action should not be disturbed by the courts under the Fourteenth
Amendment, unless they can see clearly that there is no fair reason for the law that
would not require with equal force its extension to others whom it leaves
untouched.
Id. at 269.
181. See Johnson Grass Statute, 1901 Tex. Gen. Laws 283-84, § 2 (repealed 2007)
(providing for a twenty-five dollar penalty and damages for farmers adjacent to railroad rights of
way where Johnson grass had gone to seed, but restricting this remedy to farmers who had not
allowed the weed to go to seed on their own land).
182. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Harris, 770 A.2d 82,87 (D.C. 2001) ("[T]o establish
negligence a plaintiff must prove a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff,. .. )
183. See Celeste Marie Steen, Note, FIFRA 's Preemption of Common Law Tort Actions
Involving Genetically Engineered Pesticides, 38 Aiz. L. Ray. 763, 791 (1996) ("[T~he ever-
changing nature of genetic engineering leaves the courts with no standard of care. Therefore, it
is unreasonable to think the plaintiff could prove negligence." (internal quotations omitted)).
184. Id.
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In a field where experts disagree about what the appropriate standards
should be, it may be unwise to allow the courts to decide what care is due.1
8
1
Such decisions should be made by legislatures with greater fact-finding
capacity than courts.186  Legislative or administrative pronouncements of
standards of care would reflect the overall policy preferences of the community
at large.'18 7 An appropriate statutory and regulatory regime enacted with the
purpose of establishing standards of care for growers of GE crops would place
the important policy questions presented by gene flow squarely in the hands of
the political branches of government.
4. Shortcomings of Negligence Per Se
Despite its potential utility in establishing liability in cases of gene flow,
negligence per se is not without its problems. Some have criticized the use of
regulatory standards because they tend to establish only minimum
requirements.18 8 Many courts, subscribing to this view, have therefore held that
a violation of a statute is sufficient to establish negligence, but compliance is
not necessarily sufficient to satisfy due care. 189 This being the case, a grower of
GE crops would not necessarily be fuilfilling his duty simply by complying with
the regulations. Different states give different effect to the fact of regulatory
compliance.190
185. See Richard C. Ausness et al., Providing a Safe Harbor for Those Who Play by the
Rules: The Case for a Strong Regulatory Compliance Defense, 2008 UTAH L. REv. 115, 133-
34 (stating that the courts are not well suited to evaluate safety regulations because they are not
experts, are limited to the information presented to them by litigants, and only focus on the
narrow issues before them).
186. See id. at 132-33 (arguing that legislatures are better equipped than the courts to
formulate effective safety standards).
187. See Joan M. Ferretti, Looking for the Big Picture-Developing a Jurisprudencefor a
Biotechnological Age, 10 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 711, 722 (1993) ("Cors... are ill-equipped to
create a jurisprudence embodying social value considerations which, in a democracy, are
primarily the province of the legislature. Legislation is supposed to represent collective
wisdom, borne of the fuill and public explication of the many facets of an issue.").
188. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d. 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting
that "federal legislation has traditionally occupied a limited role as the floor of safe conduct"
(emphasis omitted)).
189. See Carl Tobias, FDA Regulatory Compliance Reconsidered, 93 CoRNELL L. Rev.
1003, 1014-15 (2008) (describing the role regulatory compliance plays in establishing liability
and defenses in claims of negligence).
190. See Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 281 A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. 1971)
("Compliance with a law or administrative regulation ... does not establish as a matter of law
that due care was exercised."); Phillips v. Roux Lab., 145 N.Y.S.2d 449,451 (App. Div. 1955)
("Just as failure to comply with a statute and regulations promulgated thereunder is evidence of
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It has been suggested, however, that the courts' reluctance to allow for a
compliance defense in negligence cases is an artifact from an era when cases
involved standards of care in highly context-specific circumstances.'191 The
argument is that " [m]odern regulatory systems typically represent legislative or
administrative efforts to set optimal-not minimal-safety standards."192 Those
who argue for the adoption of a strong compliance defense contend that more
deference should be given to safety regulations because they "often represent
important policy choices by the legislative and executive branches of
government that should be respected by the courts."' 9
3
Another way that negligence per se, by itself, is not completely adequate
for dealing with gene flow is that, although an action may be negligent per se,
the plaintiff still needs to prove that the violation was the proximate cause of
the harm of which he complained. 94 This could be nearly impossible or
relatively easy, depending on the circumstances. For example, if the only
farmer growing a wind-pollinated GE crop is directly upwind and adjacent to a
conventional seed producer's crops, and the conventionally grown seed
expresses the GE trait, it would not be difficult to establish causation.
However, in a more realistic scenario, where there are numerous growers of GE
crops in an area, pinpointing the exact farm from whence genes escaped may
not be possible. A solution to this could be to enact regulations that, like the
Johnson Grass Statute, provide a remedy against neighbors who violate the
statute, regardless of causation or actual harm. 195 The possibility of a penalty
for violation of the statute, even without actual damages, could serve to deter
conduct that could result in harm. It is also important to note that the problem
of proving causation is not unique to negligence per se. The need to prove
negligence, full compliance therewith is some evidence of the exercise of due care. . . .)
19 1. See Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in
Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2152 (2000) ("In the century since the development of
the common-law rule against recognizing a regulatory compliance defense, the focus of tort
litigation has shifted from heavily context-dependent collision cases to recurring situations such
as defects in mass-produced consumer goods, which are more readily subject to nationally
uniform requirements for safeguards.. ..
192. 1d.
193. Ausness et al., supra note 185, at 157.
194. See Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[Elven when a
statutory provision does specify' a standard of care, a plaintiff must still prove .. , proximate
causation....)
195. See Johnson Grass Statute, 1901 Tex. Gen. Laws 283 § 2 (repealed 2007) (providing a
penalty of twenty-five dollars to be paid to neighbors by railroads that allow Johnson grass to go
to seed). The statute requires that damages be proved, but makes no such qualification about the
right to recover the penalty. Id.
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causation is common to all applicable theories of recovery and is equally
difficult to satisfy under any of them.'1
96
IV. Possibilities for Future Regulation
The first question to ask, when considering the regulation of GE crops, is
who should be entrusted with the task? This question must be answered as to
the allocation of responsibility among the branches of government, between the
federal government and the states, and among the various regulatory agencies.
As discussed above, the problems presented by GE farming in general, and
gene flow in particular, are well suited to being solved by legislative and
administrative action.19 7 Standards set by legislative or regulatory action and
applied in negligence per se claims would allow for more uniform outcomes
and provide greater predictability to growers of both GE and non-GE crops
than the reasonableness standards that would be applied by juries in common
law negligence claims.'198 The questions of whether civil claims for gene flow
damages should be based on state or federal regulation, and the question of
which administrative agency, if any, should bear this responsibility are
addressed below.
A. State Versus Federal Regulation of GE Crops
As described above, under the current regime, GE crops are regulated
primarily by the federal government, but there is nothing stopping a state from
enacting its own statutes or regulations governing the growing of GE crops.
Several states have chosen to enact more stringent standards than those required
196. See Repp, supra note 7, at 602-03 (discussing the application of trespass in gene flow
cases and stating that "[w]hile the technology currently exists to prove that plaintiffs' land has
been invaded and contaminated by GMOs, it may still be difficult to meet the 'causation'
element and show that the contamination came from a particular defendant"); id. at 607 (stating
that plaintiffs bringing nuisance claims for gene flow harms "will still be required to meet the
difficult causation element-to show that a defendant's conduct caused the interference with
their use and enjoyment of their property"); id. at 619-20 (stating that under a strict liability
theory, if plaintiffs could convince the court that growing of GE crops is an abnormally
dangerous activity, GE crowers could be required "to pay the consequences of the production
activities that cause damage to neighboring farmers" (emphasis added)).
197. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (discussing why standards of care for
negligence actions in certain circumstances should be set by legislatures or administrative
agencies and not by courts).
198. Supra notes 185-87.
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by federal regulators." 9 In fact, in California, several individual counties have
promulgated rules restricting the growing of GE crops .2 00  The result is a
veritable patchwork of rules and regulations .20 ' This, combined with the
variation in courts' application of regulations as standards of care in civil cases,
leaves uncertainty about what is required of GE crop growers. Furthermore, as
federal preemption of regulatory issues becomes more prevalent, the question
of what role state regulations will play in the civil cases is left open. 202
Some would argue that this diversity is healthy-that under our federalist
Constitution, the states should be allowed to "experiment with policies and
adopt laws that reflect local concerns. 203 The very fact that states have chosen
to deal with the same biotechnology issues in different ways indicates that they
have different policy concerns.20 Some states have chosen to enact voluntary
or mandatory labeling requirements for GE crops and products. 0 Over twenty
states offer tax credits, funding, or other support for development of
biotechnology.206  One state might be very concerned about protecting the
genetic identity of its seed crops, and therefore would wish to exclude GE crops
from areas where seed is produced. Another state's economy might rely
heavily on certain GE varieties, and that state's policy choices would reflect a
preference for GE crops. States may also point to episodes, such as StarLink
and LibertyLink, which show the inadequacy of federal regulations in
protecting growers of non-GE crops, as justification for state regulation.
199. See Doug Farquhar & Liz Meyer, State Authority to Regulate Biotechnology Under
the Federal Coordinated Framework, 12 DRAKE J. AGRpIC. L. 439, 459 (2007) (discussing the
various actions states have taken regarding biotechnology).
200. See A. Bryan Endres, Coexistence Strategies in a Biotech World: Exploring Statutory
Grower Protections, 13 Mo. ENvTL. L. & POL'y REv. 206, 218 (2006) (discussing bans in
Mendocino, Marin, and Trinity Counties, in California, which make it unlawful to "propagate,
raise, or grow genetically modified organisms" (quotations omitted)).
201. See id. at 219-20 (describing the complexity and variation among regulations
regarding GE crops throughout the country).
202. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. Rnv. 227, 242 (2007) (discussing the "discernable
trend, if not a dominant position, towards deference to agency preemption determinations," and
its effect on tort claims).
203. See Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 199, at 458 (stating that the Framers of the United
States Constitution intended for states to be able to adopt policies to address local concerns).
204. See id. at 45 8-59 (giving an example of five states that each have specific regulations
regarding GE fish species, and stating that each handled the issue in a unique way).
205. See id. at 459 (describing the somewhat restrictive approach some states have taken in
regulating biotechnology).
206. See id. (describing the more biotechnology-friendly tack several states have taken
regarding biotech regulation).
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On the other hand, the fragmentation of regulation may have undesirable
effects. For one thing, most agricultural products are stored and transported in
interstate systems. Because purchasers of agricultural products are most often
not in the areas where the crops are produced, it makes sense to have nationally
uniform standards and enforcement. The federal government has preempted
many causes of action that traditionally have been governed by state law.20
Because there is a presumption that federal laws do not preempt state causes of
action, unless accompanied by a congressional statement authorizing the agency
to promulgate such a regulation, any regulatory basis for civil negligence per se
claims requires such a statement. 
208
B. Which Agency Should Establish the Standards of Care to Prevent
Gene Flow?
Many of the problems that have arisen in the regulation of biotechnology
have occurred because the agency administering the regulations was operating
out of its area of expertise .209 An example of this is the fact that if the EPA had
been more aware of agricultural production and processing, it would have
known that keeping StarLink corn out of the food supply was virtually
impossible. 1 With this in mind, the USDA seems to be a natural choice to
regulate gene flow among cultivated crops. The definition of plant pest under
the PPA is broad enough to include all GE crops, regardless of what GE trait
they carry.21'1 The USDA, acting pursuant to its authority under the PPA, could
promulgate regulations that would prevent gene flow and serve as standards of
207. See Sharkey, supra note 202, at 227 (describing the trend towards federal
preemption).
208. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[Wie start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.").
209. See Mandel, supra note 62, at 2239 (stating that examples of failures in biotechnology
regulation coincide with agencies acting out of their areas of expertise). Mandel gives some
examples of agencies regulating outside of their areas of expertise, including the USDA and the
FDA's regulating environmental impacts of GE plants other than those modified to produce
PIPs and the FDA's regulating the environmental impact of GE fish and animals. Id.
210. See id. ("[H]ad the EPA ... been familiar with the nation's agricultural system, it
would have recognized that it was impossible for StarLink corn to be kept fully segregated from
corn used for human food.").
211. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing the USDA's authority to
regulate any living organism "that can directly or indirectly injure, cause damage to, or cause
disease in any plant or plant product").
683
6467 WASH. &LEE L. REV 653 (2010)
care for negligence per se claims. The regulations must clearly define the duty
and state that they create a civil cause of action. 1
C Regulations Reflecting Biological Realities
In the aftermath of the LibertyLink investigation, USDA-APHIS released
a paper stating the lessons it learned from the experience. 1 Among the lessons
learned was the need to ensure the use of the latest science for isolation as a
confinement tool.2 14 The paper says:
As breeding techniques and GE technology continue to advance, it will be
essential to incorporate the latest scientific information into APHIS'
regulatory requirements to maximize confinement ofregulated articles. For
example, APHIS will need to use the latest scientific information on factors
such as pollen flow to ensure that regulated GE material is sufficiently
isolated from conventional breeding and seed production fields. 215
In order to serve as effective standards of care for GE farmers, regulations need
to take into account the biological characteristics of the particular GE crop. A
good example of what can happen when this is not done is the USDA-APHIS
decision to allow field testing of GE creeping bentgrass .2 16 "Creeping bentgrass
is a fast-growing perennial species which is biologically and ecologically very
variable, adaptable, and robust. 01 7 It spreads rapidly via runners, wind-
pollinated flowers, and tiny seeds, and its pollen can travel up to thirteen
miles.2 1 8 The GE creeping bentgrass variety being tested contained a gene that
212. See Andre E. Costa, Negligence Per Se Theories in Pharmaceutical & Medical Device
Litigation, 57 ME. L. REV. 51, 76 (2005) ("[I]f a statute or regulation does not clearly define
what conduct is required ... it will not support a negligence per se claim.").
213. See USDA, Lessons Learned and Revisions under Consideration for APHIS'
Biotechnology Framework, at 1-4 (2007), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom-
content./2007/l 0/contentlprintable/LessonsLearnedl 0-2007.pdf. (setting out the conclusions to
the internal review of the USDA investigation of LibertyLink rice).
214. Id. at 3.
215. Id
216. See Int'l Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Johanns, 473 F. Supp. 2d 9,26 (D.D.C. 2007)
(finding that USDA-APHIS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by denying a petition to list
glyphosate resistant creeping bentgrass as a noxious weed under the PPA).
217. Id at 13 (quotations omitted).
218. See Margaret Rosso Grossman, Anticipatory Nuisance and the Prevention of
Environmental Harm and Economic Loss from GMOs in the United States, 18 J. ENVm. L.
PRAc. 107, 148 (2008) (describing the characteristics of creeping bentgrass that made it likely to
spread).
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made the plants tolerant to the herbicide glyphosate .2 19 Between 2002 and
2005, large field trials were conducted in an 1 1,000-acre control area in central
Oregon.22 In 2004, a study conducted by the EPA documented significant
gene flow from the GE creeping bentgrass into areas surrounding the test
plots.2 2'1 Given the outcrossing nature and easy vegetative reproduction of
creeping bentgrass, it is hard to imagine that gene flow would not occur.
The rate of outcrossing exhibited by a plant is an important characteristic
to consider when contemplating regulations to address the issue of gene flow.
222
Plants with high rates of outcrossing tend to pollinate or be pollinated by other
plants. By contrast, in self-pollinated plants, ovules are pollinated from anthers
of the same flower or plant .223 An example of a primarily self-pollinated crop is
soybean, which has outcrossing rates of less than one percent, and maximum
outcrossing distances of less than ten meters .2 24 Canola, on the other hand, is a
high outcrosser, with outcrossing rates as high as eighty-one percent. 2 Canola
is also capable of cross-pollinating at great distances. 2 GE traits are most
likely to move among crops that have high rates of outcrossing. 227 The high
rates of outcrossing in canola mean that genes can move easily among canola
populations. 2 Thus, growers of canola would have to take greater precautions
219. See Int'l Ctr. for Tech. Assessment, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 13 (describing the glyphosate
resistance exhibited by this variety of creeping bentgrass).
220. Id at 15.
2 21. Id
222. See Debra M. Strauss, Feast or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision Favoring
the US. Biotechnology Industry in the E. U, Ban of Genetically Modifi ed Foods, 45 Am. Bus.
L.J. 775, 779 (2008) (defining outcrossing as the "the spread of transgenes in the natural
environment through cross-pollination").
223. See MAARTEN J. CHRISPEELS & DAviD E. SADAvA, PLANTs, GENEs, AND CROP
BIOTECHNOLOGY 368 (2003) (stating that self-pollinated plants have perfect flowers, meaning
that the flowers have both male and female reproductive structures and are thus able to inbreed).
224. See Y. Yoshimura et al., Gene Flow from GMGlyphosate-Tolerant to Conventional
Soybeans Under Field Conditions in Japan, 5 ENvTL. BiosAFETY REs. 169, 171 (2006) (stating
that in a four-year study, the average outcrossing rate in adjacent rows of soybeans was 0.2%,
and that the farthest distance at which outcrossing was measured was seven meters).
225. See Alexis L. Knispel et al., Gene Flow and Multiple Herbicide Resistance in Escaped
Canola Populations, 56 WEED Sci. 72, 72 (2008) (stating that outcrossing rates in canola can be
as high as eighty-one percent).
226. See Mary A. Rieger et al., Pollen-Mediated Movement of Herbicide Resistance
Between Commercial Canola Fields, 296 Sdi. 2386, 2387 (2002) (describing a study in which
outcrossing in canola was found up to three kilometers from the pollen source).
227. See Knispel et al., supra note 225, at 72 (stating that high levels of outcrossing can
result in rapid pollen-mediated gene flow).
228. See id. at 72-73 (stating that the because of the high rate of outcrossing, pollen-
mediated gene flow has led to rapid and widespread escape of herbicide resistance genes from
GE canola fields in Canada).
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to prevent gene flow than growers of a generally self-pollinated crop, such as
soybeans."' 9
Another characteristic to consider when establishing regulations to prevent
gene flow from GE crops is the ability of the crop to hybridize with other
species, including weeds .230 This is related to the overall rate of outcrossing,
but also depends on the presence of compatible species within the area of
deployment. 23' Some crop species, such as creeping bentgrass, can hybridize
with several native and introduced species in the areas where it is grown.2 32 At
the opposite end of the spectrum are soybeans, which do not cross with any
native or introduced species in North America. 3 If a crop can hybridize with
weeds or other plants outside the cultivated field, the recipient plants could
become a source of genetic contamination long after the GE crop is gone. 3
For this reason, GE crops that can easily hybridize should be more carefully
controlled than those that do not.
A further consideration is the invasiveness of the crop species and its wild
relatives. Invasiveness is the ability to "readily increase in numbers and
aggressively spread, outcompeting other species for resources. 23 5 GE crops
that have invasive qualities present a high risk for gene flow because if crop
plants escape from fields by seed or vegetative propagule movement, or emerge
in subsequent seasons as volunteers, they can act as sources of GE
229. See M. Alejandra Martinez-Ghersa et al., Concerns a Weed Scientist Might Have
About Herbicide-Tolerant Crops: A Revisitation, 17 WEED TECH. 202, 206 (2003) (noting that
the risk for gene flow is higher with canola than with soybeans).
230. See James F. Hancock, A Framneworkfor Assessing the Risk of Transgenic Crops, 53
BioscIErNCE 512, 513 (2003) (stating that the presence of sexually compatible relatives increases
the risk of gene flow from GE crops).
23 1. See id ("[I]f compatible relatives are within the cloud of crop pollen, genes will
escape.").
232. See Lidia S. Watrud et al., Evidence for Landscape-Level, Pollen-Mediated Gene
Flow from Genetically Modified Creeping Benigass with CP4 EPSPS as a Marker, 10 1 PRoc.
OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCi. OF THE U. S. 14533, 14534 (2003) ("Natural hybrids of A.
stolonifera have been reported with six other native species."); see also F.C. Belanger et al.,
Interspecific Hybridization Between Agrostis stolonifera and Related Agrostis Species under
Field Conditions, 43 CROP Sci. 240, 245 (2003) (finding interspecific hybridization between
creeping bentgrass and Agrostis capillaris and Agrositis castellana).
233. See Martinez-Ghersa et al., supra note 229, at 206 (providing the fact that closely
related wild relatives of soybeans are not present in North America as a reason for the lack of
gene flow from GE soybeans).
234. See Knispel et al., supra note 225, at 78-79 (stating that escaped canola populations
and other Brassica species receive gene flow from cultivated canola fields and in turn transfer
those genes to other wild cultivated populations).
235. Hancock, supra note 230, at 513.
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contamination. Most crops do not persist long in natural environments, but
some, like canola, can thrive outside of cultivated areas.23 Escaped canola
populations do not persist long, and are therefore not a concern from a
238management perspective. However, if the escaped canola plants are GE, they
can contribute to gene flow.2 39
Plants that are invasive often share certain characteristics, including
discontinuous germination, vigorous vegetative reproduction, rapid growth to
flowering, brittle propagules, continuous seed production, and vigorous
competition.24 Release of GE crops with these traits should be considered
carefully. Some have argued that invasiveness cannot be reliably predicted. 4
Even if this is true, in situations where crop plants are known to have invasive
potential, regulators should be particularly cautious when considering field
testing or commercial release of GE varieties of these crops.
Regulations should also take into account the function of the gene being
expressed in the GE crop. The current regulations do this to some degree. 4
As discussed above, GE crops producing pharmaceutical agents are always
considered plant pests and subject to regulation as such.24 Different GE traits
are likely to have different environmental or health impacts.2 Although it is
236. See Linda Hall et al., Pollen Flow Between Herbicide-Resistant Brassica napus is the
Cause of Multiple-Resistant B. napus Volunteers, 48 WEED Sci. 688, 694 (2000) (stating that
GE canola volunteers have the potential to transfer GE traits to conventional canola crops for up
to four years).
237. See Knispel et al., supra note 225, at 72 ("[E]scaped canola populations have become
ubiquitous in rural landscapes throughout western Canada.").
238. See id. ("[Elscaped canola populations are believed to be transient and thus of little
management concern.").
239. See id (stating that although escaped GE canola populations are transient, they can
still contribute to movement of GE traits in a single generation).
240. See Hancock, supra note 230, at 5 13-14 (listing the traits common to the most
successful weeds and stating that "the invasive potential of a species can often be characterized
by evaluating the number of weediness traits it contains").
241. See RODIGER WITTENBERG & MATTiEw J.W. COCK, GLOBAL INVASIVE SPECIES
PROGRAMME, INvASIVE ALIEN SPECIES: A TooLKIT OF BEST PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES 99 (2001) (describing case studies that illustrate the shortcomings of efforts to
predict invasiveness based on plant characteristics, and that relying on such predictions can lead
to a false sense of security for managers and policymnakers).
242. See Thai, supra note 55, at 885 (discussing the USDA's categorical treatment of
pharmaceutical producing GE crops as plant pests).
243. Id.
244. See Steven H. Straus, Regulating Biotechnology as though Gene Function Mattered,
53 Biosci. 453, 453 (2003) ("[Slome kinds of genes in some kinds of crops need to be highly
restricted or even forbidden. But .. . large classes of genes have a high level of environmental
safety.").
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impossible to predict with absolute certainty what effect an escaped gene might
have, certain categories of genes present greater risks than others .24 ' For
example, genes that are general domestication traits are not likely to cause harm
in the environment. 4 Such traits are likely to reduce the fitness of plants
outside of the agricultural context and therefore can be expected to diminish in
frequency after escape.24 Other traits, such as cold tolerance or improved
nutrient uptake, could be beneficial to recipients of those genes, improving the
plants' fitness and increasing the frequency of the gene in the environment. 4
GE crops expressing such traits should be regulated more restrictively to avoid
potential environmental harm.
Although GE traits may have varying environmental effects, and may
require different regulatory restrictions based on those variations, adventitious
presence of GE material can have a serious impact on a non-GE crop's value,
regardless of gene function. For example, the USDA's organic certification
does not allow for any GE material, no matter what GE gene is present .249 The
European Union has a 0.9% threshold for GE contamination in foods not
labeled as containing GE products.25 As is the case with the USDA's organic
certification, this restriction does not differentiate based on gene function. 5
Experts have proposed a number of strategies to keep GE genes from
escaping. These can be divided into two main categories: ecological
containment methods and genetically-based containment methods. 5
Ecological containment focuses on manipulation of the growing environment to
prevent gene flow and is undertaken by the grower of the plant, rather than the
245. See Hancock, supra note 230, at 514 (describing five categories of risk for GE traits,
including: (1) traits that are selectively neutral in the natural environment; (2) traits tbat have
negative impacts on fitness; (3) herbicide resistance traits; (4) pest resistance traits; and (5) traits
that alter environmental tolerance or development).
246. See id. ("Genes with detrimental effects will be selected against in the natural
environment and will not spread. Many of the traits associated with crop domestication fall into
this category.").
247. Id
248. See id. at 514-15 (giving examples of GE traits that could positively impact fitness of
weeds if the genes coding for those traits escaped to weed species).
249. See National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2008) (stating that GE crops are
excluded from what can be considered organic).
250. See Alison Peck, The New Imperialism: Toward an Advocacy Strategy for GMO
Accountability, 21 GEo. INT'L ENvmL. L. Rnv. 37, 46 (2008) (stating, according to the 2004
European Union labeling legislation, the maximum allowable level of GE contamination in non-
GE labeled products).
25 1. Id
252. See ELLSTRAND, supra note 25, at 192 (describing the various methods of gene
containment that are in use or have been proposed for use with GE crops).
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scientist who releases it.253 A common form of ecological containment is
physical isolation of the GE crop from its sexually compatible counterparts. 5
Depending on the crop and the desired level of genetic purity, this could mean
buffer zones ranging from zero to over 1,000 meters. 5 Because of the
variation among crop species and even among crop varieties, regulation of
individual GE crops will have to be specifically tailored to the crop and the
conditions under which it is grown.2 5
Genetic containment strategies are based on genetic manipulation of the
crop prior to its release. 5 One example of a possible genetic containmnent
strategy is to insert genes into crop genomes that are not shared by the species
with which the crop can hybridize. 5 Another possibility is to insert genes into
organelles, which are maternally inherited .25 9 At present, these methods of
gene containment are theoretical and have yet to be effectively reduced to
260practice.
Because this Note focuses on the duties farmers owe their neighbors, the
types of regulations contemplated do not include genetic containment, which is
generally undertaken by breeders and manufacturers of seed. Instead, the
regulations proposed would involve ecological or cultural containment
methods, which could be used to establish duties of care for growers of GE
crops. The following hypothetical situation examines one restrictive measure-
a buffer zone between GE and conventional crops-and explores how this
measure could be adapted to address different policy concerns and remain




256. See Watrud et al., supra note 232, at 14,533 (discussing the disparity in outcrossing
rates and distances among crops); see also B.L. Ma et al., Extent of Cross-Fertilization in Maize
by Pollen from Neighboring Transgenic Hybrids, 44 CRop Sci. 1273, 1273 (2004) (stating that
environental conditions, such as temperature, humidity, and atmospheric water potential affect
pollen viability and outcrossing potential).
257. See ELLSTRAND, supra note 25, at 192 (discussing the ways in which genetic
containment differs from ecological containment).
258. See Jeremy R. Snyder et al., Seed Production on Triticum aestivumn by Aegilops
cylindrica Hybrids in the Field, 48 WEED Sci. 588, 592 (2000) (suggesting placement of
herbicide resistance genes in wheat on a genome that is not shared byjointed goatgrass, a weed
species with which wheat can hybridize, to reduce the risk of gene flow).
259. See ELLSThAND, supra note 25, at 198 (stating that engineering genes into the DNA of
mitochondria or chloroplasts would eliminate pollen-mediated gene flow).
260. See id. at 200 ('[Tlhe efficacy of any of these proposed [genetic containment] systems
must be tested under field conditions. Presently, not one of the options provides a general
panacea for. ... containment of domesticated alleles.").
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The graph below represents the outcrossing rates for two hypothetical
crops, Crop A and Crop B, over distance. Crop A is a highly outcrossing
species with 25% outcrossmng at 0 meters and 0% outcrossing at about 110
meters. Crop B is less of an outcrosser and has 10% outcrossing at 0 meters
and 0% outcrossing at about 85 meters.
OutcrossInfl
- - ------------
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In order to achieve a threshold of 5% outcrossing, buffer zones would
need to be approximately forty-five feet and fifteen feet for Crops A and B,
respectively. If a lower threshold is required, for example, to protect crops
grown for export to the European Union, and no more than 0.9% is allowed,
then the buffer zones would be around 100 feet for Crop A and sixty-five feet
for Crop B.
It is important to remember that regulatory agencies do not have to ensure
complete gene containment. If the regulations are to serve as standards of care
in civil litigation, they need only impose restrictions to keep gene flow below
the desired threshold. What that threshold is will depend on the policy
preferences of those promulgating the restriction. The problem with the
regulations in StarL ink was that the restrictions did not match the policies that
were driving them. In other words, by denying Aventis CropScience's
application for registration of StarLink for food uses, the EPA essentially set
the threshold for StarLink contamination at zero, but only required a buffer
zone of 660 feet, which was inadequate to achieve that goal. This
misalignment of policy and administrative requirements rendered the
regulations useless as standards of care.
If the goal is to keep contamination under a certain percentage (whatever
that percentage may be), then regulations should reflect the biological and
ecological characteristics of the crops involved. If they do so, a conventional
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farmer whose crops have been contaminated by his neighbor's GE crops can
point to the GE grower's failure to follow the prescribed growing practices as
proof that the GE grower's conduct fell short of the standard of care set by the
regulation.
V Conclusion
We live in an age of biotechnology. For better or worse, biotechnologies,
including GE crops, are a part of life and cannot be ignored. Society is faced
with the dilemma of balancing the advantages and costs of GE crops. More
concrete federal regulations that create a civil cause of action for negligence per
se and preempt state regulation of GE crops will provide safety for growers of
non-GE crops, should they adventitiously acquire GE material. To serve as
effective standards of care, these regulations must recognize and deal
adequately with biological realities of gene flow and the difficulties involved in
segregating GE from non-GE crops after harvest. Such a system, combined
with a regulatory compliance defense, would provide growers of GE crops with
predictable standards of care. When GE growers know what is required of
them, and their neighbors know that they will be protected in the event of gene
flow, all parties are better off than they are under the current, ambiguous
system.
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